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What are physical objects like when they are considered independently of their causal interactions?  Many think that the answer to this question involves categorical properties—properties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of any causal interactions those objects may enter into.  In this paper, I examine two challenges that this solution poses to Physicalism.  The first challenge is that, given that they are distinct from any of the scientifically described causal powers that they happen to convey, categorical properties will not qualify as being ‘physical’ properties.  Given the right definition of ‘physical’, this challenge can be overcome.  I argue, however, that the only way we can have a positive grasp of the nature of categorical properties is via ‘acquaintance’—a non-physical relation.  This second challenge to Physicalism cannot be overcome.​[1]​  


The Apparent Incompleteness of the Physical Sciences
The physical sciences study how objects behave in various settings and how they causally interact with one another; they are interested in what objects do, not in what they are like apart from what they do.  Consider, for example, some of the properties that are the focus of the crown jewel of the physical sciences: physics. 

…mass is knowable only by its dynamic effects.  Turn up the magnification and we find things like an electrical charge at a point, or rather varying over a region, but the magnitude of a field at a region is known only through its effects on other things in spatial relation to that region.  A region with charge is very different from a region without…It differs precisely in its dispositions or powers.​[2]​  

If we assume that the physical sciences capture the essences of the properties they posit—if, for example, we assume the laws of physics capture the essence of mass—then the properties posited by the physical sciences will be what, in the current literature, are known as ‘dispositional properties’—properties whose essences are exhausted by the causal powers they convey upon their bearers.  As a result of its essence, there is a necessary connection between a given dispositional property and the powers it conveys; mass, qua dispositional property, conveys the same causal powers in all possible worlds where it is instantiated.​[3]​ 
The fact that the physical sciences focus on what objects do, and not on what they are apart from what they do, raises a question:

Reference to the proton is fixed as the thing that causes interactions of a certain kind, that combines in certain ways with other entities, and so on; but what is the thing that is doing the causing and combining?​[4]​ 

What are protons like when they are considered independently of the various causal interactions that they enter into?  It’s hard to see how the physical sciences can answer this question.  The fact that the physical sciences seem to give us an incomplete description of the objects they describe—a description that focuses on what these objects do, and not on what they are apart from what they do—is what I’ll call the ‘the Problem of the Apparent Incompleteness of the Physical Sciences’ or ‘the Problem of Incompleteness’, for short. 
This problem has received a lot of discussion.​[5]​  Although some want reject the coherence of Chalmers’ question and argue that physical objects possess only dispositional properties (as defined above)​[6]​, many accept the coherence of the question and, in an effort to answer it, claim that physical objects have ‘categorical properties’—properties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of the causal interactions into which these objects enter.  According to the latter group, a physical object’s categorical properties are what we should point to when attempting to answer the question ‘What is the thing doing the causing and combining?’
For expositional purposes, let’s call anyone who responds to the Problem of Incompleteness by claiming that at least some of the properties of physical objects are categorical a ‘Categoricalist’.  Categoricalists differ from one another in terms of what they say about the existence of dispositional properties.  Some want to claim that physical objects possess both dispositional and categorical properties.​[7]​  Others, in contrast, want to claim that physical objects possess only categorical properties.​[8]​  According to this second Categoricalist position, the physical sciences use ‘dispositional names’—names that highlight the causal relations that the tokens of properties partake in—to refer to properties that are, in fact, categorical in nature.  Mass, for instance, is a categorical property that is picked out in virtue of the causal powers it happens to convey.  In virtue of being a non-dispositional property, however, mass conveys the causal powers it does in concert with the laws of nature and not solely in virtue of its intrinsic nature.  If the laws of nature were different, the powers conferred by mass would be different as well.  Generalizing this last point, we can say that if a categorical property conveys powers to its bearers, it does so contingently.

The First Challenge Presented by Categorical Properties
The existence of categorical properties appears to be a threat to Physicalism.  The thesis of Physicalism is often defined in terms of the physical sciences; it is often defined as the position that everything supervenes upon the properties posited by the physical sciences.  As noted earlier, the physical sciences pick out properties in terms of the causal powers they convey.  But categorical properties have intrinsic natures that are distinct from the powers they happen to convey.  As a result, the physical sciences will be incapable of describing the intrinsic natures of categorical properties.  This makes it seem like categorical properties will be missed by the physical sciences which, given the above definition of Physicalism, guarantees that categorical properties will be non-physical.  Let’s call this ‘the First Challenge Presented by Categorical Properties’.
There are ways of interpreting (or modifying) the definition of Physicalism that allow a Categoricalist to respond to this challenge.  He could, for instance, maintain that a property counts as ‘physical’ as long as it is referred to by the physical sciences.  So although the physical sciences describe properties in terms of the powers they convey upon their bearers, it could be that the properties they end up referring to are, in fact, categorical properties, properties that are only contingently connected with the aforementioned powers.​[9]​  
Another option for the Categoricalist is to define physical properties in ostensive terms.  Physical properties could be defined, for example, as the properties necessary to give a complete account of paradigmatically physical objects (such as tables and chairs).  If categorical properties are included among these properties—as you might think they would be, given the Problem of Incompleteness—then categorical properties will count as being ‘physical’.​[10]​  
The above definitions of Physicalism are controversial.  But this is no slight, for all definitions of Physicalism are controversial, including ones that straightforwardly appeal to the physical sciences (like the initial definition I sketched above).​[11]​  So when the Categoricalist says, ‘just because categorical properties have intrinsic natures that cannot be described by the physical sciences doesn’t mean that they can’t be physical properties’, his supporting argument isn’t relying on an especially controversial sense of the word ‘physical’.  
The First Challenge to Physicalism has been blunted.  It would be mistake, though, to think that this is the only way the existence of categorical properties challenges the thesis of Physicalism.  As I will show, the real challenge posed by these properties resides elsewhere; it rears its head when we attempt to explain how we can have a positive grasp of the nature of categorical properties.

What does it take to have a positive grasp of categorical properties?
If dispositional properties existed, it would be relatively easy to say what they are like—all you would need to do is point to their scientifically described causal powers.  (Recall that the essence of a dispositional property is exhausted by such powers.)  Categorical properties, in contrast, are supposed to make contributions to their bearers that are independent of the various causal interactions involving those objects.  (As we saw earlier, a categorical property can contingently convey causal powers to its bearers.  But describing these powers is not the same thing as describing the essence of the categorical property that, in concert with the laws of nature, helps to convey them.) In order for categorical properties to serve as a completely satisfying solution to the Problem of Incompleteness, we need a positive account of their essences—we need to know what they are like. 
To be clear, some Categoricalists act as though there is nothing we can point to in order to fill out our conception of categorical properties.​[12]​  According to the proponents of this extreme position, the Problem of Incompleteness reveals that physical objects possess a kind of property of which we are fated to be ignorant.  I suspect that most defenders of categorical properties, however, will not want to go this route: all we have seen so far is that the physical sciences are incapable of revealing the intrinsic nature of categorical properties.  It’s not crazy to think that there may be other ways of learning about properties that will allow us to grasp the intrinsic nature of categorical properties.  (Indeed, we will see later that it is possible for subjects to grasp the intrinsic nature of categorical properties in another way, but only at the price of denying Physicalism!)  
Where can Categoricalists turn in an attempt to fill out our conception of categorical properties?  Some turn to introspection and point to the intrinsic properties of experience—i.e. phenomenal properties—to fill out our conception of categorical properties.  Simon Blackburn, for example, claims that ‘categoricity comes with the subjective view.’​[13]​  Similarly, David Chalmers maintains that ‘There is only one class of intrinsic, nonrelational property with which we have any direct familiarity, and this is the class of phenomenal properties.’​[14]​
Another possibility is that perception allows us to grasp the essence of some categorical properties.  (John Heil, for instance, acts as though one of the best arguments in favour of categorical properties is that we can see them.​[15]​) The idea, then, is that our perceptual experiences reveal the essence of some of the categorical properties of the external objects that we see.  
	But how, exactly, does introspection or perception allow us to grasp the essence of a categorical property?  For expositional simplicity, let’s start with the idea that introspection makes us aware of categorical properties of experience.  Earlier, we defined categorical properties in negative terms: they are non-dispositional properties in that they make contributions to their bearers that are independent of the causal interactions that those objects may enter into.  Since the essence of a categorical property is distinct from the powers that it conveys in a given world, it is logically possible for there to be distinct categorical properties in this world that happen to convey the same set of powers.​[16]​  Suppose, for sake of argument, that this situation obtains; suppose that there are distinct phenomenal properties—A and A'—that happen to convey the same powers to the experiences that instantiate them.  If introspective awareness of phenomenal properties is mediated by a causal process, it follows that we will be unable to introspectively discriminate A from A' for both of these phenomenal properties are guaranteed to effect us in exactly the same way.  It also follows that we will be unable to introspectively notice a change in our experience where A is replaced by A'.
Of course, if there are no ‘primed’ phenomenal properties (such as A') in the actual world, then, in principle, introspection could discriminate all phenomenal properties from one another and could note all experiential changes from one phenomenal property to another.  But even in this case, the fact that a phenomenal property like A' is logically possible still means that we don’t have that much of a positive understanding of the essence of the phenomenal properties that actually exist, such as A.​[17]​  
To appreciate this last point, imagine a liquid superficially similar to water that has a completely different chemical nature, such as Putnam’s XYZ.​[18]​  Perception alone would not be capable of discriminating these liquids from one another.  If you were chemically ignorant and your understanding of water was exclusively perceptual, the fact that you would not be able to perceptually discriminate H2O from XYZ would reveal that you don’t have much of a grasp of the essence of water.  Now if XYZ doesn’t exist in your world—if the only clear, tasteless liquid in your world is H2O—you might be able to perceptually discriminate water from all other actual liquids.  But the fact that there could be a superficially similar liquid that you would be unable to perceptually discriminate from water still shows that you don’t have much of a perceptual grasp of the essence of water.  Analogously, if your grasp of phenomenal properties is exclusively introspective, the fact that you would be unable to introspective discriminate A from A' shows that you do not have much of a grasp of the categorical essence of A.  It doesn’t matter whether there actually is a phenomenal property in your world answering to the description of A'.
I will call this line of argument ‘the Shoemaker Argument’, for Shoemaker uses similar considerations to argue that we cannot know about or even refer to categorical properties.​[19]​  (I suspect that Categoricalists who claim that we are fated to be ignorant of categorical properties have a similar argument in mind.) In response to Shoemaker, several have pointed out that our failure to grasp the essence of categorical properties does not entail an inability to know about or refer to them.​[20]​  That’s why I want to emphasize that, in my hands, the Shoemaker Argument only establishes that we do not have a full grasp of the categorical nature of phenomenal properties.  It does not establish that we cannot know things about these properties or that we cannot refer to them. 
The Shoemaker Argument assumes that our introspective awareness of phenomenal properties is facilitated by the effects they have on us.  This assumption invites a response: perhaps our introspective awareness of phenomenal properties is via a non-causal, direct, and brute cognitive relation (‘acquaintance’) that obtains between the mind and those properties.  If this were the case, we could be directly acquainted with differences between the intrinsic natures of A and A' even if these properties happen to convey the same causal powers, for our introspective access to these properties would not be mediated via their effects upon us.  This, in turn, means Categoricalists can repel the Shoemaker Argument if they maintain that we are acquainted with the phenomenal properties of our experiences.  
We can reach the same conclusion if, instead of pointing to phenomenal properties, we try to explain what categorical properties are like by appealing to our perceptual grasp of certain properties of external objects.  If these properties of external objects are categorical, it follows, as a logical possibility, that there could be two distinct properties of external objects—B and B'—that happen to convey the same causal powers to their bearers.  If perception is a casual process, as many following H.P. Grice believe, then we will be unable to perceptually discriminate B from B' or notice a change where an external object lost B and gained B'.​[21]​  (This is just the Shoemaker Argument again, applied this time to properties of external objects.) If, however, perception involves a non-causal form of awareness of these categorical properties, the Categoricalist can rebut the Shoemaker Argument and maintain that we are acquainted with the intrinsic categorical differences between B and B' despite the fact that both of these properties are guaranteed to lead to the same effects when instantiated.  
Let’s summarize the discussion of this section.  To give a completely satisfying solution to the Problem of Incompleteness, the Categoricalist needs to give a positive account of what categorical properties are like—an account of what their intrinsic natures are like, and not just an account of the causal powers they happen to convey.  Since science is of no help with this project, the obvious thing to do is turn to introspection or perception.  As we have seen, though, the only way that either of these ideas will work is if the Categoricalist appeals to the relation of acquaintance.  In the next section, we will see that this commitment to acquaintance introduces a second threat to Physicalism.

The Second Challenge Presented by Categorical Properties
As an epistemological notion, ‘acquaintance’ has had its share of problems; there are concerns about infallible beliefs​[22]​, the speckled hen problem​[23]​, and the myth of the given​[24]​, just to name a few.  (Despite these concerns, some people continue to be drawn to the idea that we are acquainted with intrinsic features of our experiences​[25]​ while others—so-called ‘Disjunctivists’ about perception—claim that, in the case of veridical perception, we are acquainted with mind-independent properties of external objects.​[26]​)  Rather than investigate these well-worn objections, I will focus on another problem that acquaintance raises for the Categoricalist: namely, a commitment to acquaintance threatens the thesis of Physicalism.  
Before beginning, however, I have a confession: strictly speaking, I can’t prove that if there is such a thing as the relation of acquaintance, it must be a non-physical relation.  But such a conclusion seems likely.  To get a sense of the bleak prospects for a Physicalist account of acquaintance, let’s consider Joseph Levine’s recent discussion of the possibility.​[27]​  One crucial element to the notion of acquaintance is that it gives us a direct and substantial awareness of its referent.  (For convenience, I’ll assume that the referent in question is an intrinsic property of experience—i.e. a phenomenal property.)  When we are acquainted with a phenomenal property, the ‘mode of presentation’ of that property does not involve other properties (this is what makes it ‘direct’), nor is it thin as it would be in the case where I blindly point in front of myself and think, ‘I wonder what that is?’​[28]​  Rather, when we are acquainted with a phenomenal property, that property serves as its own substantial mode of presentation.
Levine investigates the prospects of a Physicalist account of acquaintance by exploring the recent trend among some Physicalists of claiming that phenomenal concepts contain, as constituents, the very phenomenal properties to which they refer.​[29]​  This can be viewed as a Physicalist-friendly attempt to capture the idea, central to the notion of acquaintance, that when we introspect a phenomenal property that property serves as its own substantial mode of presentation.  

…when we think of a relation such as acquaintance, with its sense of immediacy, metaphysical language about ‘sticking the object right in there’ irresistibly comes to mind.  But this language is metaphorical.  The current proposal is to solve the problem by taking it literally.​[30]​ 

This is an alternative account of the mechanism of introspective awareness, an account that does not maintain that we are introspectively aware of a phenomenal property in virtue of its effects upon us.  The problem, however, is that it is unclear how the physical presence of a phenomenal property in a phenomenal concept translates into a direct and substantial cognitive presence.  After all, our phenomenal concepts instantiate lots of different properties...so why it is the case that we are aware of these particular properties?  And why are we aware of these properties in this very unique and substantial manner?  As Levine says 

It still smacks of that famous cartoon of the physicist scribbling all these formulas on the blackboard with one in the middle that says ‘and then a miracle occurs’.  The transition from physical containment to awareness—the special kind allegedly afforded by phenomenal concepts—is still an inexplicable transition.​[31]​

I’m inclined to follow Levine’s lead on this. I find it utterly mysterious how the physical relation of containment (or any other non-causal physical relation) could explain the kind of awareness of phenomenal properties we are supposed to have in virtue of being acquainted with them.  It seems that in order to explain how such a relation works, we need more resources than that Physicalist can provide; it seems we need a brute non-physical relation.  This is ‘the Second Challenge Presented by Categorical Properties’, and I don’t see how Categoricalists can overcome it.  

Conclusion
In positing the existence of categorical properties—properties whose essences are not captured by the physical sciences—the Categoricalist appears to threaten the thesis of Physicalism.  As we have seen, this threat can be blunted; given the right definition of ‘the physical’, categorical properties can qualify as being physical properties.  
In order to serve as a completely satisfying solution to the Problem of Incompleteness, however, Categoricalists need a positive account of the nature of categorical properties.  In an effort to fill out our conception of these properties, Categoricalists could appeal to introspection or perception.   The Shoemaker Argument shows that the only way that introspection or perception could provide this service is if it involves acquaintance.  And in virtue of the commitment to acquaintance, the threat to Physicalism re-enters the picture.  So although the existence of categorical properties, by itself, does not threaten Physicalism, our epistemic access to these properties does.  
	What’s the proper conclusion to draw from all this?  Assuming that we want to retain our Physicalism, should we deny the existence of categorical properties and instead argue that the Problem of Incompleteness is not a problem after all?  Should we take another look at the Categoricalist position that I earlier dismissed as ‘extreme’, the position that maintains that there are categorical properties but that have no grasp of their intrinsic nature?  Or should we reconsider the very distinction between dispositional and categorical properties?​[32]​  It’s hard to say.  But one thing is for sure: we cannot give a completely satisfying answer to the Problem of Incompleteness by appealing to categorical properties without seriously threatening Physicalism.
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